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For the fourth time since February, the Slovak Parliament failed to select candidates to
replace constitutional judges whose term of office has expired. Only seven judges remain to
run the most powerful court in the country. What is more, as the Parliament enters summer
recess, the next round of hearings will not begin until mid-September.
The new President of the Constitutional Court (PCC), Ivan Fiačan, has kept a low profile
during the controversy. When the Parliament resumes its business, however, the PCC
should be prepared to defend his Court. Two senates of the Court are now defunct because
there are not enough judges to staff them. The Court has been overrun with unassigned
cases and a terrible backlog.
The PCC has two potent statutory and one informal power that allow him to put pressure
on the Parliament and contribute to the selection process: 1) the power to nominate
candidates for constitutional judges; 2) to attend parliamentary sessions; and 3) the
exclusive power to speak for the Court. In this contribution, I examine these three powers
that have great defensive potential.
Nomination Power
The selection and appointment process for constitutional judges proceeds in three steps. At
the entry-level, nominators present individual candidates for consideration to the
parliamentary Constitutional Committee. The Committee then holds live hearings to
interview the candidates. At the intermediate level, the debate and selection vote in the
Parliament take place. Finally, there is the output level of the presidential appointment,
which concludes the process.
The nomination power is generally limited to heads of several prominent state bodies, MPs,
and law faculties, all of which should have an interest in meritorious appointments to the
Constitutional Court. The PCC also has the power to make nominations to the Constitutional
Committee and the character of that power changes in the hands of the Court President
based on the time that remains to the end of her term. In the hands of a retiring PCC, the
nomination power turns into a tool to select successors. Such a PCC can thus influence the
jurisprudence of the Curt beyond her own term of office. To a newly appointed PCC, on the
other hand, this power gives the opportunity to hand-pick colleagues with whom to work.
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Let us next examine the historical record to see whether PCCs have used the nomination
power effectively. In Slovakia, we refer to four “generations” of constitutional judges that
correspond in time to the leadership of the four presidents of the Court since its
establishment in 1993. I limit my analysis to the first two PCCs who contributed to the
appointment of the second and third-generation Constitutional Court. The first PCC Milan
Čič used the nomination power only four times but to a great effect. Two of his nominees
were successfully appointed to the Court (one as its new President). The second PCC Ján
Mazák exercised the nomination power even more frequently. Mazák, and on one occasion
his Vice-President, made ten nominations to the Parliament. Five of the ten were
successfully appointed to the Court.[1]
The aggregate data for appointments in the observed period 1997-2006 further shows that
PCC nominations have a nominally higher success rate at both mid- and output level of the
selection process. The following probabilities are not adjusted for each selection and can
thus only serve as crude estimates but the average rate of success for a nominee to become
a constitutional judge is 17 percent (133 nominees for 23 positions). In comparison, PCC
nominations as a subgroup have on average 50 percent success rate (7 judges appointed
out of 14 nominees). The nomination power thus can and in the past did influence the
selection process.
Power to Attend Parliamentary Sessions
The PCC can also exert indirect influence in the intermediate stage of the selection vote in
the Parliament by attending that specific parliamentary session. According to Article 20(1) of
the parliamentary Rules of Procedure, the PCC may attend a session of the Parliament she
chooses and “cannot be excluded” from attendance by the Chairman of the Parliament.
Admittedly this power has only limited effect. The attendance of a parliamentary session
does not give the PCC a direct means to force the Parliament to act without undue delay in
selecting constitutional judges. However, because the attendance power has never been
used before, it would likely attract high media attention and change the incentive structure
for the Parliament. It would arguably cause reputational damage to the Parliament if it
ignored its constitutional obligations to the face of the PCC.
Power to Speak for the Court
Finally, there is one informal power that the PCC has, but is not based on a statutory rule.
The plenary session of the Constitutional Court has adopted an internal practice order,
whereby the PCC has the exclusive authority to represent and speak for the Court in
public.[2] No other judge is allowed to give interviews, comment on cases or judicial
matters. The only exception from this blanket prohibition on extrajudicial speech is the
academic and artistic activity of judges. The PCC is thus the single voice that can defend the
Court against attacks from the political branches, and equally the only one to criticize the
politicians if they fail to fulfill their constitutional obligation to the detriment of the Court.
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Conclusion
The powers of the PCC to nominate candidates for constitutional judges, attend
parliamentary sessions, and speak for the Court have great defensive potential, but they
can also be abused. They overlap with powers of the Parliament in certain respects, and as
such should only be used sparsely at times when the Parliament does not fulfill its
constitutionally prescribed obligations. I propose that the longer the delay in appointments,
the stronger should be the presumption in favor of the PCC to intervene one way or
another. The three examined powers make the PCC uniquely equipped to alleviate, if not
solve, the problem with appointments of constitutional judges.
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[1] The practice of the third PCC Ivetta Macejková marks a point of departure. Despite ample
opportunities, Macejková used the nomination power only once.
[2] Second sentence of the Appendix No. 1 to the Principles of Media Information on the
Decision-Making Activities of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic states: “For the
Constitutional Court, only the President of the Constitutional Court, the Vice-President and
the spokesman of the Constitutional Court shall provide information to third parties
(including print and electronic media).”
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